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A NEW PERCEPTUAL ADVERBIALISM*†
In the philosophy of perception, two views on the nature of per-ception dominate the theoretical landscape: representationalismand relationalism.1 Representationalism can be formulated in a
variety of ways, but generally, representationalists hold that funda-
mentally, perceptual states are representational states. Representa-
tional states are, or at least involve, relations to semantically evalu-
able contents; typically, representationalists treat such contents as
propositional—involving the ascription of a property to an object—
and so as capable of being true or false.2 For a perception to be
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1 In adopting this terminology, I am following John Campbell, Reference and Conscious-
ness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). This is not the only terminological op-
tion for distinguishing between the philosophy of perception’s two dominant views, but
I choose it partly for definiteness, and partly because the terms help to highlight the
features of the two kinds of views with which I am concerned.
2 Some prominent representationalists who approximately fit this description in-
clude Tyler Burge, Foundations of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Tyler
Burge, Origins of Objectivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Alex Byrne, “In-
tentionalism Defended,” The Philosophical Review, cx, 2 (2001): 199–240; Alex Byrne,
“Experience and Content,” The Philosophical Quarterly, lix, 236 (2009): 429–51; Fred
Dretske, “Experience as Representation,” Philosophical Issues, xiii, 1 (2003): 67–82;
Jerry Fodor, “Methodological Solipsism as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Science,”
in Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and John D. Trout, eds., The Philosophy of Science (Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), pp. 651–69; Ruth Garrett Millikan, “Biosemantics,”
this journal, lxxxvi, 6 (June 1989): 281–97; Adam Pautz, “Why Explain Visual Experi-
ence in Terms of Content?,” in Bence Nanay, ed., Perceiving the World (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010), pp. 254–309; Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experi-
ence, Thought, and Their Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); John R.
Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
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veridical or non-veridical is for its content to bear a certain seman-
tic relation—such as truth or falsity—to the world. As a consequence,
what ultimately distinguishes non-veridical perceptual states from
veridical perceptions is not anything mental; rather, the facts in the
world distinguish between them. This allows the representationalist
to hold that veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences are of
the same fundamental mental kind.3
On the other hand, relationalists hold that perception is not rep-
resentational. Instead, they hold that fundamentally, perception is a
relation between a perceiver and a concrete particular. As with the
representational view, relationalism can be formulated in a variety of
ways, but generally, relationalists hold that perception, as a relation, is
partly constituted by the object perceived, and so reaches out into the
world.4 Non-veridical perceptual experiences, such as hallucinations,
fail to relate us to concrete objects in the world, and so, these non-
veridical perceptual states must be of a different fundamental kind
University Press, 1983); Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2010); and Michael Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Represen-
tational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), among
many others. I acknowledge, however, that there is a great deal of variation among
these views; they differ on which kinds of properties are represented in perception,
the nature of perceptual contents, and how content is to be naturalized, to name only
three points of contention. There is also a family of views which hold that perception
is representational, but does not fundamentally involve predication. I take Tim Crane
(for example, in Tim Crane, “Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?,” The Philosophi-
cal Quarterly, lix, 236 (2009): 452–69) to fall in this camp, along with Mark Johnston
(for example, in “The Obscure Object of Hallucination,” Philosophical Studies, cxx, 1–3
(2004): 113–83), although Johnston would likely not call himself a representationalist.
3 The claim that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are of the same fundamen-
tal mental kind is what M. G. F. Martin, “The Limits of Self-Awareness,” Philosophical
Studies, cxx (2004): 37–89; and M. G. F. Martin, “On Being Alienated,” in Tamar Szabó
Gendler and John Hawthorne, eds., Perceptual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), pp. 354–410, calls the Common Kind Assumption (or CKA). The CKA is
sometimes taken to be a principle that can cleanly distinguish between representation-
alists and relationalists: representationalists are almost universally taken to endorse it,
while relationalists are often taken to deny it.
4 Versions of relationalism are defended by Bill Brewer, Perception and Objects (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Campbell, Reference and Consciousness, op. cit.;
William Fish, Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion (New York: Oxford University Press,
2009); Heather Logue, “Why Naive Realism?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, cxii, 2
(July 2012): 211–37; Martin, “The Limits of Self-Awareness,” op. cit.; Martin, “On Being
Alienated,” op. cit.; Lisa Miracchi, “Perception First,” this journal, cxiv, 12 (December
2017): 629–77; Paul Snowdon, “Perception, Vision, and Causation,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, lxxxi, 1 (June 1981): 175–92; Scott Sturgeon, “Disjunctivism about
Visual Experience,” in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, eds., Disjunctivism: Per-
ception, Action, Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 112–43; and
Charles Travis, “The Silence of the Senses,” Mind, cxiii, 449 (2004): 57–94, among oth-
ers. As is the case with representationalism, relational views vary significantly, and so my
characterization of relationalism will not capture all of these views equally well.
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than genuine perceptions.5 Given that veridical and non-veridical per-
ceptual states differ fundamentally, the relationalist often treats the
category of perceptual experiences, which subsumes both veridical
and non-veridical perceptual experiences, as a disjunctive, derivative
category.
In treating representationalism and relationalism as the only viable
views, philosophers of perception ignore several historically impor-
tant theories, one of which is the adverbial theory of perception. The
adverbial theory is the view that fundamentally, perception is not rela-
tional in structure. Rather, on the adverbial view, to perceive an object
is to be the agent of an event with certain properties, and these prop-
erties explain perception’s directedness and its phenomenal charac-
ter. While the features of perceptual events may be correlated with
the environment, such correlations are not constitutive of (nor re-
quired for) the directedness of perception. In denying that percep-
tion is relational, and developing an alternative theory in terms of
events and their properties, the adverbialist presents what looks to be
a highly parsimonious yet unified theory of perception: perception
consists only of events with various properties, and these properties
explain the directedness of perception, covary with the features of
our environments, and account for the phenomenology of our expe-
riences.
However, most philosophers of perception think that adverbial-
ism has been ignored for good reason; in fact, adverbialism is typi-
cally treated as a dead view. Frank Jackson raised what has seemed to
many to be an insurmountable problem for the adverbial view of per-
ception: the many-property problem.6 The many-property problem
purports to show that adverbialism lacks the expressive resources to
distinguish between perceptual situations in which different proper-
ties seem to be jointly instantiated. While there have been attempts
to respond to the problem—most notably by Sellars and Tye7—
these responses are subject to serious objections, and fail decisively
5 For ease of exposition, I am temporarily ignoring issues concerning veridical hallu-
cinations and illusions. In section vi, I will discuss the problems they pose for represen-
tationalism, and show how these problems do not arise for my version of adverbialism.
6 Frank Jackson, “On the Adverbial Analysis of Visual Experience,” Metaphilosophy, vi,
2 (April 1975): 127–35.
7 Wilfrid Sellars, “The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of Sensation,” Metaphilosophy,
vi, 2 (April 1975): 144–60; Michael Tye, “The Adverbial Theory: A Defence of Sellars
against Jackson,” Metaphilosophy, vi, 2 (April 1975): 136–43; Michael Tye, “The Adver-
bial Approach to Visual Experience,” The Philosophical Review, xciii, 2 (1984): 195–225;
and Michael Tye, The Metaphysics of Mind (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1989).
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when faced with a strengthening of the original problem: the many-
relations problem.8
Moreover, even if the adverbialist could solve these problems, it
seems that the view would still be semantically and metaphysically im-
plausible. It would still be semantically implausible because an adver-
bial semantics for perceptual reports appears strongly at odds with the
most natural semantics for perceptual ascriptions, and seems able to
serve, at best, as a post hoc revisionary regimentation of such reports.
It would still be metaphysically implausible because it is puzzling how
an adverbial metaphysics of perception can account for even the most
basic features of perceptual directedness: how can an event having a
certain property explain how our perceptions manage to be of things
in the external world?
In this paper, I develop and defend a new form of adverbialism
about perception. I present a semantics for perceptual reports that
solves the many-property problem and the many-relations problem
for adverbialism. The semantic view I endorse is novel in that it ar-
ticulates adverbialism from within a well-established formal semantic
framework, and ties adverbialism to a plausible formal semantics for
direct-object perceptual ascriptions in English. This shows that not
only can the adverbialist respond to what have been seen as deci-
sive logical and semantic objections, but that adverbialism as a se-
mantic proposal may even have the weight of semantic orthodoxy
on its side. I go on to show that this semantic proposal provides an
attractive view of the metaphysics of perception. The metaphysics I
develop treats adverbial perception as a directed activity: it is an ac-
tivity with success conditions. When a perception is successful, the
agent relationally perceives a concrete particular. But since on my
view, perception is not constitutively successful, unsuccessful percep-
tion is still perception, and so adverbial perception can be fundamen-
tally non-relational. The result is a novel formulation of adverbialism
that eliminates the need for representational contents and treats re-
lational perception as explanatorily basic, but also treats veridical and
non-veridical perceptual events as having a fundamental common fac-
tor. Thus, my formulation of adverbialism provides an attractive al-
ternative to both representationalism and relationalism that incor-
porates some of the most appealing features of each view, and ad-
dresses head-on the most pressing criticisms faced by adverbial theo-
ries.
8 The many-relations problem is suggested by Jackson, “On the Adverbial Analysis of
Visual Experience,” op. cit., and developed by Alexander Dinges, “The Many-Relations
Problem for Adverbialism,” Analysis, lxxv, 2 (2015): 231–37.
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i. the many-property problem
Adverbialism was originally developed with the aim of providing an al-
ternative to the act-object conception of experience: the view that in
every perceptual experience, there is an act of awareness and an ob-
ject of which we are aware.9 This conception serves as a premise in the
argument from hallucination. When coupled with the premises that
we sometimes hallucinate, and that the objects of veridical and hallu-
cinatory perceptions are of the same kind, the act-object conception
seems to lead to the view that the objects of which we are aware in
perceptual experience are non-physical objects: they are sensations,
or sense-data.
In order to avoid this conclusion, the adverbialist proposes that we
alter our view of the fundamental structure of perceptual experience.
Instead of holding that perceptual experience consists in bearing re-
lations to sensations or sense-data, and that these sense-data are cor-
related with features of our environment, the adverbialist holds that
we sense in particular ways, and that these ways of sensing are them-
selves correlated with the features of our environment. The adver-
bialist then articulates this structure linguistically by paraphrasing the
direct-objects of reports of sensation with adverbs. This paraphrase
strategy is why adverbialism warrants its name.
The traditional adverbial proposal begins by considering the case
where, in the absence of a physical object, I have a sensation of a
square, perhaps in the form of an afterimage. How are we to under-
stand my having such a sensation? Consider an analogy. Suppose that
I make a horrible error. Is the right understanding of my situation
that there is some thing, an error, such that I made it, and which has
the property of being horrible? Surely not—I was just the agent of
an event of a certain kind: I erred horribly. Similarly, the adverbialist
holds that if I have a sensation of a square, it would be a metaphysical
mistake to think that there is some non-physical thing—a sensation
or an afterimage—such that I have it, and which is square. Rather, the
adverbialist holds that I am the agent of a sensing of a particular kind,
and so, we should paraphrase direct object perceptual reports such as
(1) and (2) adverbially, as in (3):
(1) I have a sensation of a square.
(2) I sense a square.
(3) I sense square-ly.
9 The act-object conception of experience is embraced by many philosophers of per-
ception on both sides of the representationalism-relationalism divide. See Adam Pautz,
“Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence,” Philosophical Perspectives, xxi, 1 (December
2007): 495–541, for discussion.
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Further, if I happen to sense a red square, it is natural for the adver-
bialist to extend her paraphrase strategy, paraphrasing (4) with (5):
(4) I sense a red square.
(5) I sense red-ly and square-ly.
This pairs well with our analogy: if I make a horrible, unforgiveable
error, how did I err? It seems apt to say that I erred horribly and un-
forgiveably. These intuitive motivations and paraphrases form the ba-
sis of the traditional adverbial theory: the adverbialist holds that the
structure of sensation and perception consists only of an agent in-
volved in an event of a certain kind, and exhibits this by paraphrasing
the object-positions of perceptual reports with adverbs.
But how does this strategy extend to more complex cases? It is
here that the adverbialist faces a problem: the many-property prob-
lem. The many-property problem concerns the logical and expressive
resources of the language the adverbialist uses to provide her para-
phrases. It seems to show that the adverbialist cannot express complex
perceptual reports using adverbs while at the same time validating
highly intuitive inference patterns within the complements of percep-
tual reports.
Consider how the adverbialist might paraphrase a sentence such as
the following:
(6) I sense a red square and a green circle.
At first pass, it seems like the adverbialist must paraphrase the report
with a series of conjunctions, all of which are on a par:
(7) I sense red-ly and square-ly and green-ly and round-ly.
But in this paraphrase, the structure apparent in (6) has been lost. In-
stead of two, distinct sensations, each of which instantiates two specific
properties, we have only one, conjunctive way of sensing. Paraphras-
ing in this way would entail that (6) is equivalent to (8):
(8) I sense a red circle and a green square.
Clearly, however, (6) and (8) are not equivalent: they pair the same
collection of properties differently.
Call this the expressive problem for adverbialism. The expressive
problem can be illustrated with the help of our analogy: if John made
an unforgiveable, horrible error and a forgiveable, harmless error,
how did John err? If he erred unforgiveably and horribly and forgive-
ably and harmlessly, we are left without entities—in this case, errors—
on which to hang coincident properties.
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In order to solve the expressive problem, it is more common for the
adverbialist to invoke structured adverbs. For instance, Tye proposes
the following series of grammatical transformations:
(9) a. I have a sensation of a red square.
b. I have an of-a-red-square sensation.
c. I sense a-red-square-ly.10
Making use of the strategy in (9) allows us to paraphrase (6) with (10):
(10) I sense a-red-square-ly and a-green-circle-ly.
This kind of paraphrase distinguishes (6) from (8), but at a cost: it
seems to undermine our ability to validate inferences from (10) to
sentences such as (11) and (12):
(11) I sense a-square-ly.
(12) I sense a-red-object-ly.
Validating these inferences requires two steps. First, we need to allow
for conjunction elimination in (10), to obtain (13):
(13) I sense a-red-square-ly.
We then need a way of inferring from (13) to (11) and (12). The
problem, however, is that forming structured adverbs using hyphen-
ation seems to undermine the status of “red” and “square” as genuine
syntactic constituents of the report. Thus there appears to be no way
of validating these inferences in virtue of the logical forms of the as-
criptions.
The general problem is that in order to solve the expressive prob-
lem, the adverbialist forms complex adverbs using hyphenation. But
this hyphenation deprives the adverbs of structure, and renders them
inferentially inert. Call this the inferential problem for adverbialism.
The many-property problem is the dilemma formed from the ex-
pressive problem and the inferential problem. Either adverbialism
lacks the expressive resources to distinguish between perceptual sit-
uations, or it lacks the logical resources to validate intuitive inference
patterns.
10 Tye, “The Adverbial Theory: A Defence of Sellars Against Jackson,” op. cit., p. 138.
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ii. intensional transitive verbs and adverbial semantics
My defense of adverbialism begins from Anscombe’s famous claim
that perceptual verbs exhibit the features of intensionality.11 More
specifically, Anscombe claimed that perceptual verbs, including ‘sees’,
‘hears’, ‘smells’, and ‘perceives’, are intensional transitive verbs (ITVs)—
paradigmatic instances of which are ‘seeks’, ‘expects’, ‘fears’, ‘hopes’,
and ‘wants’. Intensional transitive verbs exhibit a collection of pe-
culiar features in their direct-object positions, and one semantic ex-
planation for the presence of these features, originally proposed by
Nelson Goodman and developed formally by Graeme Forbes, is that
ITVs have a reading that is non-relational. On this reading, inten-
sional noun phrases in the object-positions of ITVs do not provide
arguments to the verb.12 Instead, they serve as verbal modifiers, or ad-
verbs. This semantic idea forms the basis of my defense of perceptual
adverbialism.
However, the claim that perceptual verbs are intensional transitive
verbs is highly controversial.13 Initially, for the purposes of solving the
many-property problem, I will assume that two perceptual verbs, ‘per-
ceives’ and ‘senses’, are intensional transitive verbs. On the basis of
this assumption, I will show that applying Forbes’s formal semantics
for ITVs yields a solution to the many-property problem. Further, in-
dependently of its plausibility as a hypothesis concerning natural lan-
guage, treating perceptual verbs as ITVs yields a novel, plausible meta-
physics of perception. But the assumption I make concerning the
intensionality of ‘perceives’ and ‘senses’ can be discharged. There is
conclusive evidence that these verbs are intensional, and I discuss this
11 G. E. M. Anscombe, “The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature,”
in Ronald J. Butler, ed., Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1965), pp.
158–80.
12 See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishers, 1976):
Chapter 1; Graeme Forbes, “Objectual Attitudes,” Linguistics and Philosophy, xxiii, 2
(2000): 141–83; and Graeme Forbes, Attitude Problems (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006).
13 This debate is long, originating with G. E. Moore, “A Reply to My Critics,” in P.
Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1952): 533–667, and carried on by A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (Edin-
burgh: Penguin Books, 1956); Richard Cartwright, “Macbeth’s Dagger,” in Philosophical
Essays (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987): 13–20; Anscombe, “The Intentionality of
Sensation,” op. cit.; Jaakko Hintikka, “On the Logic of Perception,” in Models for Modal-
ities (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishers, 1969): 151–83; Robert Coburn, “Intentionality
and Perception,” Mind, lxxxvi, 341 (January 1977): 1–18; David Lewis, “Individuation
by Acquaintance and by Stipulation,” The Philosophical Review, xcii, 1 (January 1983):
3–32; Gilbert Harman, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” Philosophical Perspectives,
iv, Action Theory and the Philosophy of Mind (1990): 31–52; and David Bourget, “In-
tensional Perceptual Ascriptions,” Erkenntnis, lxxxii, 3 (2017): 513–30, among many
others.
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evidence in section vi. But in order to get the adverbial proposal on
the table, we first need to lay out the distinctive semantic features of
intensional transitive verbs.
II.1. Intensional Transitive Verbs. A verb is transitive when it takes
nominal expressions in both subject and object positions, occurring
in sentences of the form NP V NP′.14 A transitive verb V is intensional
when it occurs in sentences that exhibit at least one of the following
three properties.
NONEXISTENCE: NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP′ exists,
whereNP′ is a positively quantified NP, a bare plural, or a proper name.15
NONSPECIFICITY: NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP Vs a
particular NP′.
OPACITY: NP V NP′ has a reading that fails to entail NP V NP∗, where
NP′ and NP∗ are extensionally equivalent.
To illustrate with a traditional example, we can see that ‘seeks’ ex-
hibits Nonexistence by noting that (14) has a reading that does not
imply (15):
(14) John seeks the fountain of youth.
(15) The fountain of youth exists.
John can perfectly well seek the fountain of youth, even though no
such thing exists, but he could never find it.
‘Seeks’ also exhibits Nonspecificity, which we can see from the
fact that (16) does not imply (17):
(16) John seeks a capable business partner.
(17) John seeks a particular capable business partner.
In this case, John may merely be seeking to share his entrepreneurial
tasks with someone he thinks will help his business, and he might be
satisfied with a great number of different individuals. We can bring
this out with the following continuation:
14 However, it is common to treat V + P pairs such as “search for,” which occur in
sentences of the form NP V P NP′, as transitive verbs when the preposition serves
to introduce a prepositional argument, rather than serving as the head of an adjunct
phrase. Further, many such verb + preposition pairs have a transitive verb as a near-
synonym, as with “search for” and “seek.” In such cases, these verb + preposition pairs
appear to function as lexemes with the semantics of a transitive verb, and so unless
otherwise noted, I will treat them as such.
15 The restriction to positively quantified NPs includes quantified NPs like “a dog,”
“the men who robbed him,” “four gorgons,” and “infinitely many numbers,” while ex-
cluding negative NPs like “no dogs,” “no one,” “at most three gorgons,” and so on.
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(18) John seeks a capable business partner—but no one in particular.
Finally, ‘seeks’ exhibits Opacity. Given two coextensive NPs, substi-
tution of one for another within its complement does not preserve
truth:
(19) John seeks Ortcutt.
(20) John seeks the shortest spy.
When John seeks Ortcutt, he may not know that Ortcutt is the shortest
spy, and so the goal of his search may be to find Ortcutt and not the
shortest spy. Thus (19) has a reading that can be true while (20) is
false.
The reading that accounts for the failure of these entailments is
one that resists existential quantification, admits of nonspecific inter-
pretations for its object-position nominal, and resists substitution of
co-extensive expressions. Following Quine, we may call this reading
the notional reading.16 However, the notional reading is not the only
reading of sentences such as (14), (16), and (19); they also have a
reading that lacks these features. Consider John’s search for a capa-
ble business partner above. As we saw, John need not be looking for
any particular person, but he might be, and (16) can also be used to
report just such a search. We can bring out this other kind of search
with the following paraphrase:
(21) There’s a particular capable business partner for whom John is
looking.
Call the reading of (16) brought out by (21) its relational reading.17
The truth-conditions of the notional reading of an ITV ascription dif-
fer from those of the relational reading: the notional reading can be
true independently of whether the relational reading is true, which
is why the notional reading is sometimes said to be “existence neu-
tral.” When a transitive verb exhibits all three of the features outlined
above, and figures into ascriptions that are ambiguous between no-
tional and relational readings, I will say that it is paradigmatically inten-
sional.
16 W. V. Quine, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,” this journal, liii, 5
(March 1956): 177–87.
17 What I am here calling the “notional” and “relational” readings go by many names
in the literature. The terms “notional” and “relational” are due to Quine, ibid., but the
readings also go by “intensional” and “extensional,” “nonspecific” and “specific,” and
“de dicto” and “de re.” I have chosen “notional” and “relational” mostly because the terms
are relatively theoretically neutral, and are evocative of the kinds of states attributed by
the two readings in question.
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II.2. Adverbial Semantics for ITVs. Suppose that John seeks a dragon.
Dragons do not exist, and even if they did, John might not be seeking
a particular one. This leaves us with a puzzle: is seeking a relation? If
so, when John seeks a dragon, what kind of thing is it that he seeks?
Different approaches to the semantics of intensional transitive verbs
give different answers. Some claim that the direct object of John’s
search is a property, while others claim that it is a generalized quan-
tifier. Others claim that searches are covertly propositional attitudes,
or that John is searching for a non-existent dragon.
An alternative view is that there is no object for which John is
searching, and that on its notional reading, ‘seeks’ does not express
a relation. Rather, John is engaged in a search of a particular kind:
a dragon-search. This is the basic idea underlying Goodman and
Forbes’s non-relational approach to the notional reading. On their
view, when (22) is construed notionally, the noun phrase ‘a dragon’
does not denote the direct object of John’s search:
(22) John seeks a dragon.
Rather than providing a direct-object argument for ‘seeks’, ‘a dragon’
serves as a modifier; it classifies John’s search as a search of a par-
ticular kind. According to Forbes, intensional verb phrases, such as
the notional reading of ‘seeks a dragon’, have a semantics on a
par with phrases involving complex, quantificational modifiers such
as ‘one-woman university’, ‘two-man bobsled’, ‘three-story building’,
and ‘many-splendored thing’.
Forbes develops this idea into a compositional theory of the se-
mantics of ITVs. Forbes holds that many intensional transitive verbs
denote kinds of events, and so he presents his theory in a neo-
Davidsonian framework in which events are a basic type. Event-
semantic frameworks make use of thematic roles, which specify the roles
that various objects play in an event. Simple sentences involving ex-
tensional transitive verbs typically employ a thematic role called a
‘Theme’ which specifies the event’s direct object. For example, the
logical form of (23) is given in (24):
(23) John found a dog.
(24) ∃e(finding(e) & Agent(e, John) & Theme(e, a dog)).
When an extensional transitive verb has a quantificational argument
in object position, it is common to “raise” the quantifier; in this case,
‘a dog’ can be raised all the way above the event quantifier, leaving
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a variable behind as a trace.18 With the quantifier raised, the logical
form of (23) is given by (25):
(25) ∃x[dog(x)](∃e(finding(e) & Agent(e, John) & Theme(e, x))).
In (25), the quantifier binds the variable from the outside—it “quan-
tifies in”—which is why we only get a specific, existence-entailing read-
ing for the indefinite: this reading says that there is a particular dog
that is the theme, or direct-object, of John’s finding.
But this strategy of raising the quantifier cannot account for no-
tional readings. On the notional reading of (22), ‘a dragon’ is inter-
preted nonspecifically, and the ascription is not existence-entailing,
but raising the quantifier to a wide-scope position forces a specific,
existence-entailing reading.19 The solution to this problem, according
to Forbes, is to treat the notional reading as non-thematic, or “theme
suppressed”: notional searches, unlike findings, do not have direct
objects.20 This captures the idea that on their notional readings, ITV
ascriptions are non-relational; in the case of (22), there is nothing for
which John is searching.
In place of a theme, Forbes introduces a new thematic role, which
he calls “Char,” to account for the Nonexistence and Nonspeci-
ficity of the notional reading. “Char” is short for “characterization”
or “is characterized by.”21 According to Forbes, Char is a theoretical
primitive that expresses Goodman’s notion of classification: Char is
posited specifically to capture the semantic contribution of quantifi-
cational modifiers such as ‘three-story’ in ‘three-story building’ and
‘many-splendored’ in ‘many-splendored thing’.22
Formally speaking, Char is a relation between an event and a gen-
eralized quantifier. Generalized quantifiers are the semantic values
18 For an account of this approach to quantifiers in argument position, see Chapter 6
in Irene Heim and Angelika Kratzer, Semantics in Generative Grammar (Marsden: Wiley-
Blackwell Publishers, 1998).
19 The inability to raise an embedded intensional QNP is just illustrative. Other ac-
counts of quantification, including views that employ type shifting, such as Herman
Hendriks, Studied Flexibility (University of Amsterdam: PhD Thesis, 1993), and con-
tinuization, such as Chris Barker, “Continuations and the Nature of Quantification,”
Natural Language Semantics, x, 3 (September 2002): 211–42, also fail to capture the
nonspecificity of notional readings.
20 Forbes’s term is “non-thematic,” but the term “theme suppression” is an indepen-
dent term for the same idea from the literature on incorporation. We will discuss in-
corporation further below.
21 In case the reader wants guidance on pronunciation, I pronounce “Char” the same
way as I pronounce the first four letters of “characterization”—that is, identically to
“care.”
22 Forbes, Attitude Problems, op. cit., p. 83.
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of quantified NPs such as ‘a dragon’ and ‘three bears’.23 Thus, on
Forbes’s view, the logical form of the notional reading of (26) is given
by (27):
(26) John seeks a dragon.
(27) ∃e(search(e) & Agent(e, John) & Char(e, a dragon)).
In (27), Char is a relation between an event—specifically, a search of
which John is the agent—and the generalized quantifier that is the se-
mantic value of the quantified NP ‘a dragon’ (which I denote with a
dragon). The reason that “Char” can serve as a modifier is that it does
not specify the object for which John is searching. John is not searching for
a generalized quantifier; if there were an object for which John was
searching, it would be the theme of his search, but as we have seen,
John’s search has no theme. Characterization allows the quantifier to
play a different role in John’s search: the generalized quantifier char-
acterizes John’s search, but is not its object.
An analogy may be helpful here. John may run a marathon, or John
may run with scissors. In the former case, the marathon is the theme
of John’s running—it is what he runs—but in the latter case, even
though John does bear some relation to scissors, namely, running with
them, he does not run them: the scissors are not the theme of his
running. To say that John runs with scissors is to specify how John runs:
it is to say that John runs in a particular way, namely, with scissors.24
Analogously, for John’s search to be characterized by the quantifier
a dragon is not for him to search for a generalized quantifier—the
generalized quantifier is not the direct object, or theme of his search.
Rather, the quantifier plays a role analogous to that of the scissors,
in that it helps to specify how John searched: John searched in a way
characterized by a dragon.
According to Forbes, for an event to be characterized by a general-
ized quantifier is for that event to have certain success conditions. For
John to search for a dragon, notionally, is for him to be the agent of
a search that is successful only under certain circumstances: he is the
23 Formally speaking, in an extensional type theory, generalized quantifiers are sets of
sets, which are the semantic values of expressions of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. In Forbes’s frame-
work, a dragon is the function λP∃x(dragon(x) ∧ P(x)): it is the set of all sets that
contain at least one dragon. In an intensional framework such as Montague’s, the type
of a quantified NP is 〈s, 〈〈s, 〈e, t〉〉, t〉〉: it is a function from worlds to sets of properties,
where properties themselves are functions from worlds to sets of entities.
24 However, “run” certainly does not mean different things in the two cases: it is not
lexically ambiguous. The same is true for “seeks”: the difference between “Char” and
“Theme” in a verb’s argument structure does not reveal a lexical ambiguity.
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agent of a search that is successful only if he finds a dragon. Thus, in-
tensional NPs in the object-positions of intensional ascriptions serve
to categorize or classify the event in question as one with certain suc-
cess conditions. It is these conditions that account for the directed-
ness of John’s search as well as the inferential behavior that we observe
within the complements of ITVs.
Forbes uses Char to fix the success conditions of an intensional as-
cription by stating meaning postulates that govern Char’s behavior.
In order to accomplish this, Forbes states a schema every instance of
which serves as a meaning postulate in his theory. The schema, for
non-compound QNPs, is the following:
(28) (Char(Q))(e) iff (for any ⇀e such that R⇀ee, for Qx, there is some
e′ that is part of ⇀e such that Fe′ and x is a theme of e′).25
In the schema, ⇀e is a course of events, R is a relation that holds be-
tween an event and a course of events when the latter makes the for-
mer successful, and F stands in for a fully extensional verb denoting
a kind of event that makes e successful. The entire schema then says
roughly the following: an event e is characterized by a generalized
quantifier Q  iff necessarily every course of events that makes e suc-
cessful has a subevent e′ which has Qx as its theme.
An example will be helpful here. If you are searching for a dog,
you are engaged in a search with certain success conditions. Searches
are successful when you find what you are looking for, so the schema
above says that a successful search will require a finding of a certain
sort. A bit more formally, a search is characterized by the quantifier a
dog just in case, necessarily, whenever that search is successful, you
find a dog. This example illustrates how the quantified NP comple-
ments of intensional transitive verbs specify conditions under which
events are successful, and spells those conditions out in terms of cer-
tain objects being the themes of a corresponding non-intensional as-
cription.26
Explaining the behavior of intensional transitive verbs in terms of
success conditions allows us to validate crucial inference patterns that
hold within the complements of intensional verbs. Most notably, it
allows us to validate an inference pattern called upward monotonicity:
25 Forbes, Attitude Problems, op. cit., p. 106.
26 Specifying such conditions will be difficult: in particular, specifying the success
conditions for any particular intensional ascription will requiring finding a verb that
states what qualifies as success for that event: for every verb like “seek,” we must have a
verb like “find,” in terms of which its success can be specified.
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(29) John seeks an F →
John seeks a G, where F ⊆ G.
To use a concrete example, the schema above governing the behavior
of Char entails that inferences such as the following are valid:
(30) John seeks a dog →
John seeks a mammal.
This inference is valid because necessarily, every event in which John
finds a dog is one in which he finds a mammal, and so, necessarily, his
original search is successful only if he finds a mammal, which is just
to say that John seeks a mammal.
We can recast this argument schematically as follows: a search e is
characterized by a generalized quantifier Q  iff necessarily, in every
course of events that makes e successful, the agent finds Q . But if,
necessarily, whenever the agent finds Q , she also finds Q ′, then neces-
sarily, her search is successful only if she finds Q ′, and so her search is
also characterized by Q ′. But this means she was also searching for
Q ′. It follows that if John seeks a dog, he seeks a mammal, and that
Mary seeks a building block, she seeks a material object. Further, this
basic pattern does not just hold for non-compound NPs. As we will
see below, this schema also validates upward monotonic inferences
that result from characterization by conjunctive and disjunctive quan-
tified NPs. In the next section, we will see that the validity of these
inference patterns serves as an important part of the solution to the
many-property problem.
iii. adverbial semantics for perceptual verbs
We can now apply Forbes’s semantics—in particular, the mechanisms
of theme-suppression and characterization—to perceptual verbs. This
application yields an initial adverbial semantics for perceptual reports
on which perception has no direct object. However, this semantics
still involves the relation of characterization, which some might ar-
gue keeps the view from being fully adverbial. To address this worry,
I go on to develop a modified version of Forbes’s semantics which
eliminates even this relation. On the modified view, perceptual verb
phrases, construed notionally, do not involve relations at all.
III.1. Adverbialism through Characterization. Consider the following
example:27
27 As I mentioned above, when stating my own view, I will make use of “perceives” as
opposed to “senses,” since the goal of my view is to give a theory of perception rather
than a theory of sensation.
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(31) Mary perceives a dragon.
If we treat (31) as an intensional ascription, (31) will have two read-
ings. Applying Forbes’s semantics, the logical form of the notional
reading is given by (32):
(32) ∃e(perceiving(e) & Agent(e, Mary) & Char(e, a dragon)).
The logical form of the relational reading is given by (33):
(33) ∃e(perceiving(e) & Agent(e, Mary) & Theme(e, a dragon)).
In (32), the event of perceiving, of which Mary is the agent, has no
theme: there is no object of any type that Mary perceives. Rather, ac-
cording to (32), Mary is the agent of a perceiving, and that event is
characterized by the generalized quantifier a dragon. For Mary to
be the agent of a perceptual event that is characterized by a quan-
tifier is not for her to bear the perceptual relation to the general-
ized quantifier; characterization does not specify the direct object of
Mary’s search. Rather, characterization allows the generalized quanti-
fier to modify the perceptual event, and it does so by specifying the
event’s successconditions. Hence, for Mary to perceive a dragon no-
tionally is for her to be the agent of a perceptual event that has certain
success conditions, but lacks a direct object.28
In order to specify what it is for a perceptual event to be successful,
we need to make use of another extensional verb; just as what it is for
a search to be successful is to find what you’re looking for, we need to
find a verb that specifies what it is for a perception to be successful.
Once we find this verb, we will be able to instantiate the schema above
that governs the behavior of Char. One possibility is to find a fully
extensional perceptual verb and use it to state these conditions. For
instance, if ‘sees’ (or ‘hears’ or ‘smells’) is fully extensional, then we
can say that a perception of a dragon is accurate only in the case that
we see one. But since intensional transitive verbs have a relational
reading in addition to their notional reading, there is another option
available to us: we can state the success conditions for the notional
28 One might ask how can this view be formulated in standard first-order logic with-
out events. Such a reformulation is not easy, since ordinary first-order logic does not
allow for the modification of predicates. However, we might say that in cases of notional
perception, the agent bears a non-perceptual relation to a non-dragon. We can call this
relation “perceptual characterization.” We then have that Mary perceives a dragon no-
tionally iff Mary bears the relation of perceptual characterization to the generalized
quantifier a dragon. Importantly, the relation of perceptual characterization is not
the relation of perception, and so in notional perception, the agent does not bear the
perceptual relation to anything at all.
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reading of each ascription with the corresponding relational reading.
This allows us to state the success conditions of perceptions using two
readings of the very same verb: we can state the success conditions of
a perception reported with the notional reading of ‘perceives’ using
the relational reading of ‘perceives’.
With these points out of the way, we can now instantiate the schema
governing the behavior of Char with our generalized quantifier
a dragon.
(34) An event of perceiving e is characterized by the quantifier
a dragon iff  for every event ⇀e that makes e successful, ⇀e has
some subevent e′ such that e′ is a relational perception, and a
dragon x is such that e′ has x as a theme.
Roughly, this says that an event of perceiving is characterized by the
quantifier a dragon just in case, necessarily, every event that makes
the perceiving successful has a subevent which is a relational perceiv-
ing of a dragon. To take another example, an event of perceiving is
characterized by the quantifier two red squares iff, necessarily, every
event that makes this perception successful has a subevent which is a
relational perceiving of two red squares.
The schema above shows how characterization provides success
conditions for perceptual events: characterization specifies success
conditions in terms of a modal pattern of relational perceivings. Thus,
while an agent may fail to relationally perceive at our world, they may
still be the agent of a perceptual event that has success conditions at
this world. Insofar as an event of perceiving has such conditions, it
will be an instance of non-relational perception: it will have success
conditions specified by Char, and so will be directed, but will not have
a relational structure, since the event has no direct object. However,
when the event is successful, there will be an event of perceiving with
a relational structure: an event in which the perceptual event has a
theme, and so one in which the agent relationally perceives a dragon.
III.2. Adverbialism through Incorporation. When applied to perceptual
reports, Forbes’s semantics for notional readings is adverbial in the
following sense: on such readings, there is no object that the agent
perceives, and so in hallucinatory cases where the relational reading
is false, there is nothing to which the agent bears the perceptual re-
lation. However, the semantics for notional readings involves char-
acterization, which is a different, non-perceptual relation that holds
between an agent and a generalized quantifier. Given the claim in the
introduction that adverbialism is a non-relational account of percep-
tion, on which the properties of perceptual events explain all of per-
ception’s important features, one might reasonably object that the ac-
count just given is not fully adverbial. But such an account, on which
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perceptual events have only unary properties, can be easily formu-
lated, and there are semantic reasons in favor of adopting it.29
Before positing Char as a theoretical primitive, Forbes considers
the proposal that the logical form of the notional reading of (35) is
given by (36):
(35) Mary perceives a dragon.
(36) ∃e((a-dragon(perceiving))(e) & Agent(e, Mary)).30
In (36), ‘a-dragon’ modifies ‘perceiving’: it takes a predicate of
events, ‘perceiving’, and returns a new predicate of events, ‘a-dragon-
perceiving’. The hyphenated modifier ‘a-dragon’ is derived from the
the quantificational denotation of ‘a dragon’ through a type-shift
occasioned by the notional reading. Using this idea, we can formu-
late the semantics of the notional reading of a perceptual ascription
schematically as follows:
(37) ∃e(Qn -perceiving(e) & Agent(e, Mary)).31
On this view, the semantic structure of the notional reading is identi-
cal to that of complex NPs such as ‘three-story building’ and ‘many-
splendored thing’; this view treats intensional noun phrases as seman-
tically incorporated.32 When a nominal is semantically incorporated, in-
29 It is illuminating to compare these two forms of adverbialism to the forms of rep-
resentationalism discussed by Pautz, “Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence,” op. cit..
The adverbial view that results from characterization is structurally similar to the view,
endorsed by Pautz, on which one sensorily entertains (but is not aware of) a property
or a complex of properties. On both of these views, in perception, an agent bears some
theoretically defined relation to an abstract object, but the agent is not perceptually
aware of that abstract object—the abstract object is not the direct object of perception.
The difference between the views is that characterization is designed to function like
an adjunct such as “with,” while “sensorily entertaining” is not. The form of adverbial-
ism that I develop in this section eliminates the relation of characterization, and in so
doing eliminates the similarity to Pautz’s form of representationalism.
30 Forbes, Attitude Problems, op. cit., p. 83.
31 Since many different kinds of arguments can be incorporated, the resulting mod-
ifiers can modify the verb in many different ways. In (37), the subscripted n serves to
index the modifier to the argument-place that it incorporates. In this case, the sub-
scripted n shows that the modifier is derived from a notional QNP in direct-object
position, and so that Mary’s perception is of a dragon (in the notional sense), rather
than, for instance, by a dragon or with a dragon.
32 Most notably, compare this semantics to the one for incorporation structures given
by Veneeta Dayal, “Hindi Pseudo-Incorporation,” Natural Language and Linguistic The-
ory, xxix, 1 (2011): 123–67, at p. 147, which also makes use of theme-suppression
and hyphenation. For further discussion of semantic incorporation, see Veerle van
Geenhoven, Semantic Incorporation and Indefinite Descriptions (Stanford: CSLI Publica-
tions, 1998); Veerle van Geenhoven and Louise McNally, “On the Property Analysis
of Opaque Complements,” Lingua, cxv, 6 (June 2005): 885–914; Greg Carlson, “The
Meaningful Bounds of Incorporation,” in Svetlana Vogeleer and Liliane Tasmowski,
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stead of contributing an argument to the verb, it serves, semantically,
as a modifier that restricts the verbal denotation. The resulting verb
phrase is interpreted as a complex, intransitive verb.
Unlike a semantics that makes use of characterization, on an incor-
porated semantics, the only object involved in the perceptual event
is the agent. There is no generalized quantifier, or any other kind
of entity, to which the agent or the event bears a relation. Formally
speaking, however, the incorporated semantics is equivalent to the se-
mantics given with characterization: each instance of characterization
can be translated into an instance of incorporation, and vice-versa.
Further, the other elements of Forbes’s analysis carry over to the in-
corporated case straightforwardly, which allows the incorporated se-
mantics to validate all of the same inferences as the semantics given
in terms of characterization. Instead of stating a schema governing
Char, we can state a schema governing the behavior of hyphenated
quantificational modifiers. Just as in the case of Char, these modifiers
specify the success conditions of events:
(38) Qn -perceiving(e) iff  for every event ⇀e that makes e successful, ⇀e
has some subevent e′ such that e′ is a relational perception, and
Qx are such that e′ has x as a theme.
In other words, to perceive notionally is to Qn -perceive, and to
Qn -perceive is just to be the agent of an event with certain success
conditions. Those success conditions are specified by using the re-
lational reading of ‘perceives’: in order for an agent to successfully
Qn -perceive, there must be Qx such that the agent relationally per-
ceives x. However, the agent can Qn -perceive whether or not these
conditions are satisfied. The fact that these two formulations are
intertranslatable should be unsurprising: characterization is a theo-
retical primitive designed to capture the ways in which the mean-
ings of notional readings are like those of their incorporated para-
phrases.
However, there is an important difference between characteriza-
tion and the incorporated view. The proposal that notional readings
are instances of semantic incorporation is a substantive empirical hy-
pothesis, while characterization is a theoretical primitive posited to
explain incorporation-like behavior. Thus characterization is not sub-
ject to empirical constraints in the same way that the incorporated
eds., Non-Definiteness and Plurality (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company,
2006); and Olga Borik and Berit Gehrke, eds., The Syntax and Semantics of Pseudo-
Incorporation (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015).
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proposal is. But there is much to be said in favor of the view that no-
tional readings are genuinely incorporated. First, many intensional
NPs meet the criteria laid out by Greg Carlson for qualifying as se-
mantically incorporated.33 Additionally, treating notional readings as
semantically incorporated straightforwardly explains Nonexistence
and Nonspecificity, and perhaps Opacity as well. Further, theme-
suppression, which is the mechanism by means of which Forbes ac-
counts for notional readings, is characteristic of semantic incorpo-
ration anyway.34 Finally, the view that intensional transitive verbs se-
mantically incorporate their direct-object NPs has been defended at
length by Veerle van Geenhoven and Louise McNally.35 Thus, while
a full defense of the view that notional readings are instances of se-
mantic incorporation goes beyond the scope of this paper, I take the
proposal that notional readings are semantically incorporated to at
least be an empirically plausible variant of Forbes’s view.
Thus we have two forms of adverbial semantics: one provided by
Forbes’s notion of characterization, and one provided by semantic in-
corporation. Which view we should adopt will depend on the results
of detailed semantic investigation. My own view is that the intension-
ality of ITVs should be accounted for in terms of incorporation—or at
least that incorporation plays a central role in the semantics of ITVs—
but such a view is admittedly controversial. For the purposes of solving
the logical and semantic problems for adverbialism, I will make use of
characterization, since this is a mainstream, off-the-shelf account of
the semantics of ITVs. However, given their formal equivalence, ev-
erything that can be done with characterization can likewise be done
with an incorporated semantics and the accompanying schema given
in (38).
iv. solving the problems for adverbialism
We are now in a position to show how the adverbial semantics pre-
sented in the last section can solve the many-property problem and
the many-relations property for adverbialism. I will illustrate how this
can be done using characterization, but the solution using an incor-
porated semantics is exactly analogous.
33 Carlson, “The Meaningful Bounds of Incorporation,” op. cit..
34 See Dayal, “Hindi Pseudo-Incorporation,” op. cit., at p. 147; and Borik and Gehrke,
The Semantics of Pseudo-Incorporation, op. cit., at p. 26.
35 van Geenhoven and McNally, “On the Property Analysis of Opaque Comple-
ments,” op. cit., section 3. The incorporated semantics developed by van Geenhoven
and McNally differs somewhat from the semantics presented here. I defend a differ-
ent incorporated semantics for intensional NPs—one that is more similar to the pro-
posal made here—in my “Intensionality and Semantic Incorporation” (unpublished
manuscript).
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IV.1. Solving the Many-Property Problem. Let’s begin by considering the
first horn of the dilemma that the many-property problem poses. Re-
call that the first horn is the problem of distinguishing between com-
plex perceptual reports such as those below:
(39) Mary senses a red square patch and a green circular patch.
(40) Mary senses a red round patch and a green square patch.
Jackson originally objected that adverbial paraphrases of (39) and
(40) would lose all structure, leaving something to the effect of:
(41) Mary senses redly and squarely and greenly and roundly.
However, characterization allows us to preserve the structure of the
verb’s complement. For example, the logical form of (39) would be
the following:
(42) ∃e(sensing(e) & agent(e, Mary) & Char(e, a red square patch and
a green round patch)).
This is easily distinguished from (43):
(43) ∃e(sensing(e) & agent(e, Mary) & Char(e, a red round patch and
a green square patch)).
Thus, Forbes’s semantics solves the expressive problem for adverbial-
ism: since Forbes’s adverbs are quantificational modifiers, and the
complements of the verbs denote different generalized quantifiers,
the events will be characterized differently, and so will be distinct.
But Forbes’s semantics also validates inferences involving the quan-
tificational modifier. As we saw above, the rules governing Char vali-
date upward-monotonic inferences, and the key to solving the infer-
ential problem is to treat the inferences that the adverbialist needs to
underwrite as monotonicity inferences. However, the schema above
did not apply to conjunctive QNPs. But a similar schema can be stated
for conjunctive quantifiers, and this schema validates conjunction
elimination:
(44) Char(e,Q and Q′) iff (for any ⇀e such that R⇀ee, for Qx there is
some e′ which is part of ⇀e such that Fe′ and x is a theme of e′, and
for Q′y, there is some e′′ which is part of ⇀e such that Fe′′ and y is a
theme of e′′).
Roughly, (44) says that an event is characterized by a conjunctive
quantifier if and only if, necessarily, in every event ⇀e that makes
the original event e successful, for Qx and Q′y, ⇀e has two relational
subevents, one of which has x as a theme and one of which has y as
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a theme. To illustrate with an example, Mary’s search is characterized
by the quantifier a dog and a cat if and only if every course of events
in which her search is successful has a subevent in which she finds a
dog and a subevent in which she finds a cat.
This transfers over easily to the case of perception. Consider (42).
Mary senses a red square patch and a green round patch notionally
just in case her search is characterized by the quantifier a red square
and a green circle. Mary’s sensing is characterized by this quantifier
iff necessarily, every course of events in which her sensing is success-
ful has a subevent in which Mary relationally senses a red square patch
and a subevent in which she relationally senses a green round patch.
But necessarily, every such course of events is one with a subevent in
which Mary relationally senses a red round patch. Thus it follows that,
necessarily, in every situation where Mary’s sensation is successful, she
relationally senses a red round patch. But this is just to say that Mary’s
sensing is characterized by the quantifier a red round patch. Thus,
we validate the weakening inference from Mary senses Q and Q′ to
Mary senses Q. But we know from above that ITVs validate mono-
tonic upward inferences for non-compound QNPs: necessarily, every
event in which Mary relationally senses a red round patch is one in
which she relationally senses a round patch. So Mary senses a circle
notionally, or senses round-ly. This solves the inferential problem for
adverbialism.
IV.2. Solving the Many-Relations Problem. The last section showed how
a theory of perceptual adverbialism based on the semantics for inten-
sional transitive verbs solves the many-property problem as it was pre-
sented by Jackson.36 However, Alexander Dinges presents a strength-
ening of the many-property problem that he calls the “many-relations”
problem.37 The problem is as follows: perceptual reports not only at-
tribute many properties to particular sensations, but these sensations
are related to one another. Consider the following perceptual report:
(45) Jane senses a red object that is brighter than a green one and to
the left of a yellow one.
In (45), Jane is in a perceptual situation in which she senses three
things, each of which has different properties, and in which one of
these objects stands in relations to the other two. The challenge for
the adverbialist is to construct modifiers that not only pair properties
36 Jackson, “The Adverbial Analysis of the Objects of Sensation,” op. cit. See also Frank
Jackson, Perception: A Representative Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1977).
37 Dinges, “The Many-Relations Problem for Adverbialism,” op. cit..
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correctly, but reidentify a single sensation as standing in two separate
relations.
This problem undermines the only other solution to the many-
property problem on offer: the operator theory proposed by Michael
Tye.38
However, Forbes’s semantics handles relational ascriptions such as
(45) easily. The logical form that Forbes’s semantics provides for (45)
is given in (46):
(46) ∃e(sensing(e) & agent(e, Jane) & Char(e, a red object that is
brighter than a green one and to the left of a yellow one)).
Importantly, “a red object that is brighter than a green one and to
the left of a yellow one” is a single, intensional, quantificational NP,
and in (46) it contributes a generalized quantifier as an argument to
Char. Here is the lambda expression for the generalized quantifier it
provides as an argument:
(47) λP∃x∃y∃z (red(x) & green(y) & yellow(z) & brighter-than(x, y) &
left-of(y, z) & P(x)).
In (47), the relative clause “that is brighter than a green one and
to the left of a yellow one” serves to restrict the original quantifier
denoted by “a red sensation”: it tells us what kind of red sensation Jane
is having. The multiple relations are built into this relative clause. In
light of this, the quantifier serves to characterize the event of sensing
as one that would be accurate in certain circumstances, namely, in the
circumstances in which Jane in fact sees a red patch that is brighter
than a green patch and to the left of a yellow patch. Further, Char
licenses inferences from (45) to sentences such as (48):
(48) Jane senses a red object.
Thus, applying Forbes’s semantics solves both the expressive and in-
ferential problems, even when applied to perceptual reports with
38 Tye, The Metaphysics of Mind, op. cit.. Dinges shows that Tye’s view cannot account
for multiple relations. While Tye’s proposal is the only fully developed solution to
the many-property problem on the table, a more recent proposal, given by Uriah
Kriegel (in “Intensional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality,” Philosophical Per-
spectives, xxi, 1 (December 2007): 307–40 and “The Dispensability of (Merely) Inten-
tional Objects,” Philosophical Studies, cxli, 1 (October 2008): 79–95) gestures at a solu-
tion. Kriegel’s idea is to adopt a version of the fused adverb solution to the expressive
problem, and then solve the inferential problem by pointing out that Jane perceives
a-red-square-ly is a determinate of the determinable Jane perceives a-square-ly (and
inferences from determinates to determinables are generally valid). The proposed so-
lution has been criticized by Alexander Grzankowski, “The Determinable-Determinate
Relation Can’t Save Adverbialism,” Analysis, lxxviii, 1 (January 2018): 45–52.
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highly structured, relational complements. Characterization, together
with the tools of generalized quantifier theory, yields a method for
specifying the accuracy conditions for arbitrarily complex perceptual
experiences.
v. perception and intensional transitive verbs
Above I showed how treating perceptual verbs as intensional transi-
tive verbs, and providing an adverbial semantics for ITVs, solves the
many-property problem and the many-relations problem for adver-
bialism. But are perceptual verbs in fact intensional transitives? This
question is vexed. It appears that the question was first raised by G. E.
Moore at the beginning of the twentieth century, and many papers
have addressed the question since, but there is no clear philosophi-
cal or linguistic consensus on its answer; philosophical and linguistic
opinion is largely divided.39
However, there is empirical evidence that points toward a resolu-
tion of this long-running dispute. In order to test perceptual verbs
for the features of intensionality, I designed and ran three studies.
Each study compared three perceptual verbs, ‘sees’, ‘perceives’, and
‘senses’, to one paradigmatically intensional verb, ‘search’, and one
paradigmatically extensional verb, ‘touch’, with respect to one of the
three features of intensionality. The results of these studies were strik-
ing: ‘perceives’ did not differ statistically from ‘search’ with respect to
either Nonspecificity or Opacity, and while it did differ statistically
from ‘search for’ with respect to Nonexistence, its mean score was
still much closer to that of ‘search’ than to that of ‘touch’. ‘Senses’
likewise exhibited intensional behavior: it behaved intensionally with
respect to Nonspecificity and Opacity. By contrast, ‘sees’ exhib-
ited primarily extensional behavior: it was both existence-entailing
39 G. E. Moore, “The Nature and Reality of the Objects of Perception,” Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, vi, 68 (1905): 68–127. See also Moore, “A Reply to My Critics,”
op. cit.. Among those who hold that some of our perceptual verbs exhibit the features
of intensionality are Moore himself; A. J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge
(London: Macmillan, 1940); Ayer, “The Problem of Knowledge,” op. cit.; John Raymond
Smythies, Analysis of Perception (London: Routledge, 1956); Anscombe, “The Intention-
ality of Sensation,” op. cit.; Hintikka, “On the Logic of Perception,” op. cit.; Berit Bro-
gaard, “Perceptual Reports,” in Mohan Matthen, ed., Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of
Perception (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Bourget, “Inten-
sional Perceptual Ascriptions,” op. cit.. Among those in the opposing camp, who hold
that perceptual verbs are fully extensional, are Cartwright, “Macbeth’s Dagger,” op. cit.,
J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Fred Dretske,
Seeing and Knowing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Jackson, “Perceiving,”
op. cit.; John Barwise, “Scenes and Other Situations,” this journal, lxxviii, 7 (1981):
369–97; and Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century, Vol. 2: The Age of
Meaning (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), to name just a few.
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and fully specific, and received an intermediate score with respect
to Opacity.40 Thus, these studies provide strong evidence in favor of
the conclusion that ‘perceives’ and ‘senses’ are intensional transitive
verbs.41
Historically, however, there has been significant resistance to the
idea that perceptual verbs have notional readings, and there have
been attempts to explain the apparent presence of such readings in
alternative ways. Developing a view due to Austin, both Dretske and
Soames have argued that apparent notional readings of our percep-
tual verbs are a result of pragmatics rather than semantics.42 Briefly,
Dretske and Soames argue that our perceptual reports may convey
propositions that are free from existential commitments, but semanti-
cally, perceptual ascriptions have only one reading, and do not exhibit
the features of intensionality. But the results of the experiments give
us two reasons to think that this proposal is incorrect. First, if apparent
notional readings are in fact pragmatic, then we lack an explanation
of the stark differences between ‘sees’ and ‘perceives’. If we can con-
vey an existence-neutral proposition with ‘perceives’, there seems to
be no reason why we could not do so with ‘sees’ as well—pragmatics
cannot account for the contrast. Second, given that ‘perceives’ does
not differ from ‘search for’ with respect to two of the three prop-
erties of intensionality, and is close to it with respect to a third, the
pragmatic proposal would lead to us treating the notional reading of
‘search for’ as merely apparent as well, even though ‘search for’ is
paradigmatically intensional.
Thus, the results of the experiments above give us strong reasons
to think that some perceptual verbs have genuine notional readings.
Forbes’s adverbial semantics is one of the most fully developed ac-
counts of the notional reading (although as I indicated above, I prefer
an incorporated variant on Forbes’s view). If one of these adverbial se-
mantic accounts is correct, it shows that adverbialism, as a view on the
nature of perception, is semantically conservative: adverbialism fol-
lows from the true semantics for perceptual reports in English. How-
ever, adverbial accounts are not the only accounts of the semantics of
40 For a full discussion of the intensional features of these perceptual verbs, along
with the analyses and raw data from the studies I mention here, see my “An Empirical
Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger” (unpublished manuscript, available upon
request).
41 They also provide a surprising resolution to the puzzle of Macbeth’s dagger: Mac-
beth cannot see a dagger, given that there is no dagger for him to see, but he can perceive
one; ‘perceives’ is semantically weaker than ‘sees’.
42 Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, op. cit.; Dretske, Seeing and Knowing, op. cit.; Soames,
Philosophical Analysis in the 20th Century, op. cit..
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ITVs. Some approaches to the notional reading that treat it as having
a direct object, but treat this direct object as an abstract object, such as
a property or a generalized quantifier. Other views treat the notional
reading as a covert propositional attitude. When applied to percep-
tual verbs, these competing semantic views yield different accounts of
perception.43 I do not have space here to argue that all of these re-
lational approaches to the notional reading are inadequate.44 For my
purposes, it suffices to point out that adverbial views are among the
best candidates in the semantic literature for giving the true structure
of the notional reading.
vi. the metaphysics of perceptual adverbialism
We have seen that the adverbialist has at her disposal a semantics with
the expressive and logical resources to solve both the many-property
problem and the many-relations problem, and that this semantics is
also a plausible semantics for natural language perceptual reports.
However, this is not an advance for the philosophy of perception
unless the adverbial semantic proposal yields an otherwise plausible
metaphysics of perception. The goal of this section is to show that it
does.
VI.1. From Semantics to Metaphysics. Consider a perceptual ascription
such as (49):
(49) John perceives a unicorn.
Assuming that ‘perceives’ is an intensional transitive verb, (49) has
two readings: a notional reading and a relational reading. On the fur-
ther condition that Forbes’s semantics for intensional verbs is the cor-
rect one, these two readings have the following logical forms:
(50) ∃e(Perceiving(e) & Agent(e, John) & Char(e, a unicorn)).
(51) ∃e(Perceiving(e) & Agent(e, John) & Theme(e, a unicorn)).
43 For example, Bourget (in “Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions,” op. cit.) likewise ar-
gues that perceptual ascriptions are sometimes intensional. Bourget (in David Bourget,
“Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism,
and Representationalism about Perceptual Experience,” Erkenntnis, lxxxiv, 2 (2019):
381–408) then applies the traditional Montagovian semantics for ITVs to perceptual
ascriptions, and so, on his view, perception has a generalized quantifier as a direct ob-
ject. Bourget then claims that the result favors a version of representationalism. There
are many connections between Bourget’s approach and my own, but I maintain that
Forbes’s view is superior to the traditional Montagovian view, and so the adverbial view
has a better claim to the semantics of our perceptual ascriptions.
44 For a criticism of relational approaches to the notional reading, and a defense of
adverbial approaches, see Forbes, Attitude Problems, op. cit., pp. 70–72.
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If we adopt the incorporated variant of Forbes’s view, then the no-
tional reading of (49) will instead have the form given in (52):
(52) ∃e(Qn -perceiving(e) & Agent(e, John)).
Everything I say below concerning the metaphysics of perception will
hold whichever of the two adverbial semantic proposals we choose.
If we treat the logical structure of the notional and relational read-
ings as the basis for a metaphysics of perception, we see that percep-
tion comes in two forms: what I will call the adverbial and relational
forms of perception. Since the logical forms above are articulated in
a neo-Davidsonian semantic framework, intensional verbs introduce
quantification over events, and so both the adverbial and relational
forms of perception are events with agents. Claiming that perceptual
events have agents does not mean that perception is a fully intentional
activity. However, it does mean that the agent plays an important role
in the event, and that perception must be person-level (as opposed to
subpersonal). In a certain sense, perception is something that we do.
However, beyond this, I do not wish to take a hard stance on the na-
ture of perceptual agency. For now it will suffice to say that agents play
an active role in perceiving, while leaving the details of this proposal
for another time.45
Recall that in our semantic proposal above, the notional and rela-
tional readings of perceptual ascriptions are intimately related: the
latter is used to specify the success conditions for the former. Meta-
physically speaking, this means that the success conditions of an in-
stance of adverbial perception are specified in terms of correspond-
ing relational perceptions: whenever an adverbial perception is suc-
cessful, the agent relationally perceives the correct (kind of) object.
One way of putting this is to say that adverbial perception aims at
relational perception. But what kinds of events are adverbial and rela-
tional perceptions? Let’s begin by considering relational perception.
The features of relational perception are the features of the kinds
of events expressed by extensional verbs in neo-Davidsonian seman-
tics more generally. Such verbs, in addition to having an agent, typi-
cally also have themes. But there are many kinds of events that have
themes—which kind of event is relational perceiving? First, relational
45 Miracchi, “Perception First,” op. cit., argues that perception is an activity with an
agent and an aim, and claims that insofar as it has an agent, perception must be person-
level. However, she too wishes to resist the idea that perception is a fully intentional
action.
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perception is something that is aimed at, and it is constitutively suc-
cessful. In these respects, relational perception resembles an achieve-
ment. In Vendler’s classic categorization of verbs in terms of tempo-
ral structure, achievements are both punctual and telic: they are the
endpoints, or goals, of various kinds of activities.46 Paradigm cases of
achievements are events such as reaching the summit of a mountain,
stabbing Caesar, and finding Nemo: these events are instantaneous,
and involve achieving a certain goal. If this goal is not achieved, the
event has simply not occurred. However, unlike paradigmatic achieve-
ments, relational perception need not be punctual: we can perceive
things for certain amounts of time. I can perceive John’s face for sev-
eral minutes, and track a ball through the air for several seconds.
If I can perceive in this way, it seems that perception cannot be an
achievement, at least in Vendler’s sense, since achievements are in-
stantaneous. This pushes us toward the more traditional view that re-
lational perception is a state that is temporally extended.
I hold that relational perception has some features of both achieve-
ments and states. Consider one kind of relational perception: touch-
ing. On the one hand, touching something can be an achievement:
its onset is instantaneous, and it may be the endpoint or goal of an ac-
tivity of trying to touch something. But you can also touch things for
periods of time, or touch things without trying. My view is that all rela-
tional perceiving is like touching. Relational perceiving is telic, insofar
as there is an instant at which it is achieved; namely, the moment at
which you perceive something relationally. Further, if you fail to per-
ceive something relationally, no relational perceiving has occurred.
However, after this endpoint, there may be a state of relational per-
ceiving that is temporally extended. In what follows, I will treat it as
an achievement that may be temporally extended, although I think
it could equally well be seen as a state at which adverbial perception
aims; for my purposes, nothing turns on deciding between these two
ways of speaking. Of course, there is much more to say about rela-
tional perception, but since my focus here is on adverbial perception,
I will remain agnostic about the remaining details.
Adverbial perception is a novel kind of perceptual event. Adverbial
perception does not have a theme, and so is not relational; instead,
to perceive an F is to be the agent of a an event of a particular kind.
Being the agent of such an event is best construed as being the agent
of an activity. Typical examples of activities are running, talking, and
46 Zeno Vendler, “Verbs and Times,” The Philosophical Review, lxvi, 2 (April 1957):
143–60.
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cycling, which stand in contrast to achievements: on Vendler’s cat-
egorization, activities are temporally extended and atelic. However,
adverbial perception differs from these activities in that it has success
conditions. As we saw above, these success conditions are specified
by Char: an instance of adverbially perceiving a unicorn is successful
only if the agent relationally perceives a unicorn. In virtue of hav-
ing success conditions, adverbial perception is directed, or has a goal.
The goal of a particular instance of adverbial perception is to perceive
relationally. However, unlike in the case of achievements, it is not con-
stitutive of adverbial perception that this goal be reached; since the
notional readings of intensional transitive verbs are existence-neutral,
we can perceive adverbially without perceiving relationally.
The resulting picture is one in which adverbial perception is telic,
insofar as it has a goal, but achieving the goal is not constitutive of
perceiving adverbially.47 Other events falling into this category are
searches, tryings, chasings, huntings, fleeings, plannings, and foresee-
ings, just to name a few. Using the language of activities and achieve-
ments, adverbial perception is an activity that is aimed at an achieve-
ment, namely, a relational perception (although it need not be aimed
at a particular relational perception). Taken together, we can see ad-
verbial and relational perception as different parts of a single event:
an accomplishment. An accomplishment is a temporally extended telic
event; it is a successful directed activity, or an activity together with
an achievement. Thus, accomplishments have the right properties to
subsume successful instances of adverbial perception, in which the
goal of the adverbial perception is reached.
A useful comparison is to treat successful perceptions as analogous
to successful searches: in a successful perception, you perceive both
adverbially and relationally, while in a successful search, you seek and
you find. In both cases, events of the former kind are aimed at events
of the latter kind, and the latter is involved in specifying the success
conditions of the former.
VI.2. Fundamentality and Factoring. No proposal concerning the
metaphysics of perception would be complete without a discussion
of how adverbial perception and relational perception relate to the
perceptual kinds ordinarily discussed in the philosophy of percep-
tion: perceptual experience, hallucination, illusion, and perception
(where the latter is construed as a factive or existence-entailing state).
Roughly speaking, adverbial perception corresponds to perceptual
47 This means that Vendler’s traditional categorization of kinds of events neglects an
important category: intensional events. Intensional events are directed activities that
are not constitutively successful.
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experience. It is neutral between success and failure—one can adver-
bially perceive whether or not one relationally perceives. Relational
perception corresponds to the ordinary sense in which relationalists
use “perception,” except for the fact that, as I said above, I treat rela-
tional perception as a certain kind of event.
Hallucination is ordinarily taken to be a kind of perceptual experi-
ence in which the object of our experience does not exist, or is simply
absent from our environment.48 Hallucinations differ from illusions
in that, when we are under an illusion, we are perceptually related to
an object in our environment, but somehow perceive or perceptually
represent that object incorrectly (as having a property that it does not
in fact have). On my view, hallucination occurs when we perceive ad-
verbially, but our adverbial perception fails to culminate in an event of
relational perception. In other words, when we adverbially perceive,
but are not also the agents of a relational perception that makes our
adverbial perception successful, we are subject to a hallucination. This
construes hallucination as a failure: it is a failure to perceive relation-
ally, or a failure to achieve. The requisite event, an instance of rela-
tional perception in which the adverbial perception culminates, has
simply not occurred. However, our adverbial perception still has suc-
cess conditions, and can still explain why our hallucination still has a
distinctive phenomenal character.
What about illusions? How can the adverbial view account for the
properties things seem to have? The most natural way to account for
illusions is to claim that in an illusion, there is a single event in which
we both adverbially perceive and relationally perceive, but that the
adverbial perception is not made successful by the relational percep-
tion: there is a mismatch between the adverbial perception’s success
conditions and the instance of relational perception. In such a case,
the event will have both a theme and be characterized by a quantifier,
and in such an event, I am perceptually related to a particular object,
but I see the object as my adverbial perception dictates. Property as-
cription, and “seeing as,” are part of adverbially perceiving. I might be
perceptually related to a clump of seaweed, while having an adverbial
perception of that seaweed as an octopus. In such a case, my adverbial
perception clashes with the concrete object to which I am related by
means of relational perception, and so I perceive the object as it is
not: I am subject to an illusion.
48 Although veridical hallucinations are an exception to this idea; I will discuss veridi-
cal hallucinations at the end of this section.
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Alternatively, it is possible to treat illusions as being expressed by
the so-called “split” readings of intensional transitive verbs.49 On a
split reading, the quantificational determiner is “split” from its restric-
tor by the verb: the determiner is interpreted outside of the scope of
the verb while the restrictor is interpreted inside its scope. The most
natural interpretation of a split reading is that there is a particular
thing to which one is related, but one is related to it only under a cer-
tain guise or description which the object may not satisfy: one does
not see it as the thing that it is. If illusions can in fact be captured
by split readings, this would present interesting correspondence be-
tween the different scopal readings of intensional transitive verbs and
the important perceptual kinds. I do not have space to defend this
proposal at length here, but I simply gesture to it as an interesting
route available to me in explaining the nature of illusions.
We can summarize my view as follows. There are two forms of per-
ception: adverbial and relational perception. To adverbially perceive
an F is to be the agent of an event with a certain property: it is to
F -perceive, or to perceive F -ly. In turn, what it is to F -perceive is to
have certain success conditions: it is to be the agent of an event that
is successful only if you relationally perceive an F . I take this as a
definition of what it is, metaphysically speaking, to F -perceive: for a
perception to have certain success conditions is just for it to be a per-
ception of a particular kind, specified adverbially via characterization.
In turn, these success conditions can either be satisfied or unsatisfied.
When they are satisfied, adverbial perception is successful, and we
have achieved our goal, which was to relationally perceive. But when
these conditions are not satisfied, we will be in the grip of a halluci-
nation or an illusion. We are subject to illusion when we relationally
perceive, but this relational perception does not satisfy the adverbial
perception’s success conditions, while when we hallucinate, we fail to
perceive relationally at all.
49 Timothy Williamson, Modal Logic as Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015): Ch. 1 makes use of split readings of modal sentences in arguing for necessitism,
but such split readings go back at least to Janet Dean Fodor, The Linguistic Description
of Opaque Contexts (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970), and are
discussed at length by Ezra Keshet (in Good Intensions: Paving Two Roads to a Theory of the
De Re/De Dicto Distinction (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008) and
“Split Intensionality: A New Scope Theory of De Re and De Dicto,” Linguistics and Philoso-
phy, xxxiii, 4 (2010): 251–283) and Zoltán Gendler Szabó (in “Specific, Yet Opaque,” in
Maria Aloni, Harold Bastiaanse, Tikitu Jager, and Katrin Schulz, eds., Logic, Language,
and Meaning: 17th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 16–18,
2009, Revised Selected Papers (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, 2010): 32–41 and “Bare
Quantifiers,” The Philosophical Review, cxx, 2 (2011): 247–83).
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How does this view differ from representationalism and relational-
ism about perception? Representationalists often endorse two prin-
ciples which I will here call Factoring and Common Factor. Typ-
ically, these principles are taken as going hand in hand. The basic
idea behind Factoring is that veridical and non-veridical percep-
tual experiences can be factored into components: they can be ana-
lyzed into a mental component, namely a representational state, and a
non-mental component: the state of the world, perhaps together with
some other conditions ensuring that the state of the world is appro-
priately related to the representation.50 Veridical and non-veridical
perceptual states are then taken to be mentally alike in having a com-
mon factor: they are both representational states, and differ only
with respect to how the representation is related to the world. This is
similar to the way that the traditional theorist about knowledge holds
that knowledge can be factored into belief, truth, justification, and
perhaps an anti-Gettier condition, and then holds that belief is a com-
mon factor between cases in which a subject knows and cases in which
she does not.
Relationalists, by contrast, typically deny both Factoring and Com-
mon Factor: often, relationalists take perception, as a relational state,
to be explanatorily prior to other states, and part of taking perception
to be explanatorily primary is that it cannot be factored into compo-
nents, or analyzed. As a consequence of both the relational nature
of perception and its explanatory primacy, relationalists often hold
that perception is of a fundamentally different kind than other per-
ceptual states such as hallucination—there is no common factor be-
tween veridical perception and hallucination. In this respect, the re-
lationalist’s position is similar to that of a knowledge-first epistemolo-
gist: relational views of perception are sometimes called “perception-
first” views, in that they treat relational perception as explanatorily
primary.51
50 Such conditions are needed to rule out veridical hallucinations from cases of gen-
uine perception. On some views, such as that in Searle, “Intentionality,” op. cit., the
condition that the state of the world be appropriately related to the perception is built
into the content of the perception itself.
51 For an account of perception-first views, see Miracchi, “Perception First,” op. cit.
Miracchi takes perception-first views in the philosophy of perception to be analogous
to knowledge-first views in epistemology. Similarly to how Timothy Williamson in Knowl-
edge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) holds that Gettier cases pose
an insurmountable problem for analyses of knowledge, Miracchi holds that cases of
veridical hallucination pose an insurmountable obstacle for views of perception that
involve Factoring. Analogously to Williamson, Miracchi adopts a perception-first view
partly in light of such puzzles. The view I endorse here is similar to the view proposed by
Miracchi, in that it takes perception to be explanatorily primitive and takes perception
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Where does the adverbialist view stand with respect to these two
principles? First, does the adverbialist accept Factoring? The short
answer is no, at least not in the form in which the representationalist
accepts it. The adverbialist holds that a successful adverbial percep-
tion can be factored into an adverbial perception and a relational
perception which makes it successful. But both adverbial and rela-
tional perception are ultimately explained in terms of relational per-
ceptions. Thus my view does not involve Factoring successful percep-
tion into worldly and mental factors, and so does not need to provide
an analysis of veridical perception in terms of a mental state bear-
ing an appropriate relation to the world. Rather, my view takes rela-
tional perception as explanatorily primitive, and defines the success
conditions of adverbial perception in terms of it. My view is thus a
perception-first view: it gives explanatory primacy to relational per-
ception.
But given that perception-first views typically reject Common Fac-
tor, does the adverbialist have to reject it as well? No, the adverbialist
can still endorse Common Factor, at least in a certain form. Since
we know that the notional reading of a perceptual report can be true
whether or not its relational reading is true, the form of perception
it expresses, adverbial perception, can be present whether or not we
relationally perceive. To put this in terms of events, adverbial percep-
tion is a directed activity that can either be successful or unsuccess-
ful. Successful perception is an accomplishment: it includes both the
activity of adverbially perceiving and an achievement of relationally
perceiving. Hallucination is a case where the activity of adverbially
perceiving fails to culminate in an achievement. But adverbial per-
ception is a fundamental part of both of these cases. This is what we
should expect, given the nature of adverbial perception: to perceive
adverbially is to be the agent of an event with certain success condi-
tions, and these conditions may or may not be satisfied. Of course,
in the case of successful adverbial perception, there is something ad-
ditional present: there is an event of relational perception in which
the adverbial perception culminates. But both successful and unsuc-
cessful perceptions are fundamentally events with success conditions
specified in terms of a modal pattern of relational perceivings. This
to be an activity whose aim is to perceive relationally, but differs on several important
points and is motivated by radically different considerations. Unlike Miracchi, I hold
that successful and unsuccessful perceptual events have a common factor, and that this
factor is a person-level perceptual event. Additionally, where Miracchi invokes com-
petences to explain the directedness of perception, I invoke person-level intensional
events that have success conditions, but are not constitutively successful.
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allows veridical and hallucinatory perceptual events to be instances of
the same kind of activity.
vii. conclusion
Above I showed how the adverbialist can adopt the tools used to pro-
vide a semantics for intensional transitive verbs and use them to solve
the many-property problem, and its strengthening, the many-relations
problem. In itself, this is a significant advance for adverbialism about
perception. But additionally, articulating adverbialism with the tools
of intensional semantics opens the prospect of unifying the semantics
and metaphysics of perception: it is empirically plausible that percep-
tual verbs are intensional transitive verbs. Further, by taking the adver-
bial semantic proposal seriously, I articulated a metaphysics of percep-
tion on which adverbial perceptual states are person-level perceptual
activities aimed at relational perception. On this view, a successful in-
stance of perception is an accomplishment—it involves both a directed
activity and an achievement. On my view, the success conditions of
adverbial perceptual states are specified in terms of a modal pattern
of relational perceivings, and thus my view takes relational percep-
tion as explanatorily basic. My view is thus a “perception-first” view.
But in contrast to other perception-first views, my view allows veridi-
cal and hallucinatory perceptual events to have a common mental
factor: they both involve the activity of adverbial perception, and are
differentiated by whether adverbial perception culminates in an event
of relational perceiving. This rehabilitation shows that the adverbial
theory of perception is not dead; it is alive and well, and provides an
attractive third option to representational and relational views in the
philosophy of perception.
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